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
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Background  
of  
The Manchurian Trouble

*A companion pamphlet to the  
"Background of The Shanghai Trouble."  
(This can be had, free, on request)*

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## BACKGROUND OF THE MANCHURIAN TROUBLE

### Rise of the Manchus

A look at the map is a convincing proof that Manchuria is what the international lawyers call *sui generis*—in a class by itself. The 1,500-mile Great Wall separating Manchuria from China is the first thing that meets the eye. North and South are respectively called “outside” and “inside” the Wall, sometimes “extra-mural” and “intra-mural” China, though the latter term is more often rendered “China Proper.”

The Great Wall, one of the wonders of the world, was built by the Emperor Shih Huang-ti in B. C. 221-209. He “completed an enormous wall on the northern boundary of the Empire,” says Dr. F. L. Hawks Pott, in his “Chinese History.” Within were camps, on top were towers, and outside were moats and ditches. It was destined to divide not only an empire but a civilization. To the north lived “barbarians” who were beyond the pale of the Chinese.

Border struggles made the Great Wall the scene of turmoil lasting for years at a time. “Barbarian” and Chinese swayed back and forth in dark confusion. Sometimes China was able to subdue the northern “barbarians.” This she did by setting tribe against tribe—the classic principle of Chinese foreign policy. The conquered were not treated as Chinese. They were feudatories to the State, who rendered tribute to the Emperor. Alternate periods were marked by “barbarian” invasions and occupations of China Proper.

The Manchus were a clan belonging to one of these outside-the-Wall Tartar tribes called the Nuchen Tartars. They often figured in this frontier warfare. So powerful



did they grow early in the present era that they ruled the northern half of China Proper for 145 years as the Kin dynasty. Eventually displaced by the Mongols, a neighboring Tartar tribe, who routed both Kin and Chinese, they returned to Manchuria, beaten and broken up. For several hundred years they stayed under a cloud.

In the seventeenth century they irrupted out of obscurity. Under the leadership of a great general, they knit together the outlying tribes, until the old Nuchen confederation was reformed. They then drove over the Wall, beat the Chinese, and set up the Manchu dynasty at Peking (now Peiping) in 1644. No greater Empire has ever been created than the Chinese Empire under the Manchus.

But Manchuria still remained the Manchu homeland. And for 263 years the Manchu Emperors of China maintained this status. Manchuria was their private domain. It became no more China, either to the Chinese or to their Manchu overlords, than Hanover became England when George I. Elector of Hanover became King of England.

Manchu means pure. So jealous were the Manchus for the purity of their homeland that Chinese immigration into Manchuria was restricted much as Chinese immigration into the United States is restricted. Evidences of Chinese population north of the Great Wall prior to the Manchu dynasty are many. But Manchuria's Chinese population has its foundation in the bootleg traffic carried on during the Manchu dynasty.

The first change occurred in 1907. From being governed as a separate possession, Manchuria became a viceroyalty, still, however, responsible to the Emperor. There was no abatement of the attitude of the Manchu House

toward their ancestral home. But, influenced by the increasingly powerful Chinese mandarin at the Court, they did relax sufficiently to lower the bars against Chinese immigration.

### **Position Created by Manchu Abdication**

Four years later, in 1911, the dynasty abdicated, and the Chinese republic took its place. The change was in no sense an overthrow. The Revolution ended in a treaty with the Manchu Emperor. In the China Mission Yearbook of 1913, Professor L. R. O. Bevan, Professor of International Law at Peking University, explains that the "final agreements are in the nature of a treaty between two independent communities." Tang Shao-yi, one of the negotiators, and later first Republican Prime Minister, gave the reason for the treaty in the *Peking Daily News*, November 15, 1924. He said:

"We agreed to that treaty because by abdicating the Manchus made it unnecessary to prolong the period of the revolution, saved human life, and gave us an opportunity to settle down to reconstruction."

In return for his abdication the Emperor, then a child of five, was allowed to use the title Manchu Emperor, to live in the Imperial palaces of the Forbidden City of Peking, and to receive a money allowance from the Republican government. One clause in the treaty laid the duty upon all Chinese governments to accord to the Manchu Emperor all the respect due to a foreign sovereign.

Warlordism, not republicanism, succeeded the Manchu dynasty. Government revenues flowed into military war chests. Warlordism had its feet planted so firmly on the neck of the Chinese people that by 1924 it ceased to pay

any attention to form or ceremony. In that year the ruling militarists in Peking (Peiping), Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang, so-called Christian General of China, ejected the Emperor from his palaces.

Marshal Feng turned out the Emperor at the point of the sword without leaving him time even to collect a change of clothes. And he then divested him of his titles and property and told him that henceforth he would be known as plain "Mr." Yet the rest of the court were allowed to retain either princely or ducal titles. This fact reveals the true intent of the coup. The Forbidden City was a melon in a country which had been almost sucked dry by warlordism. Stories of the dispersal of the Emperor's treasures were current in Peking for over twelve months.

The Manchu Emperor, as a fugitive, had nowhere to turn. He found asylum in the Japanese Legation. Finally, managing to escape from Peking, he took up his residence in the Japanese Concession at Tientsin. If it had not been for the Japanese proffer of shelter, he would most probably have been divested of his life as well as his property.

Chinese had long been used to the excesses of warlord China. That it never kept its agreements was taken for granted. But such conduct toward a sacred treaty with a scion of such revered Emperors of China as K'ang Hsi and Ch'ien Lung whom the Chinese had sworn to accord the respect due to a foreign sovereign profoundly agitated Chinese feeling. Tang Shao-yi, who is sometimes referred to as China's Grand Old Man, wondered "whether there is any sense of decency left in the land" (*Peking Daily News*, November 15, 1924). Dr. Hu Shih, intellectual leader of China, said that it was "a disgraceful proceeding, which will go down in history as the most



unsavoury act of the Chinese republic" (*Peking and Tientsin Times*, November 17, 1924). But the general indignation of which these are only two examples could avail nothing in a land in which the deed of the military man was law.

### Manchu Rights

So the Manchu Emperor became Mr. Henry Pu Yi. He did not sign a new agreement invalidating the Abdication Treaty. When Feng's soldiery appeared at the palace gates, they produced a document which they said was a revision of the Abdication Treaty. It declared that the Manchu Emperor renounced his title and his palaces, together with the Imperial allowance of Chinese \$4,000,000 a year, all for a solatium of Chinese \$500,000 a year. In an interview soon after the coup, Mr. Pu Yi stated:

"I did not sign that paper, whatever may be said to the contrary. And I do not accept it. It was forced on me. Not that I would not have agreed to a revision of the Abdication Treaty. I simply ask that the revision be done in a proper way, that I be given courteous treatment." (*North China Daily News*, November 24, 1924.)

There need be no further explanation of why Mr. Pu Yi is now in Manchuria as the new Regent. He is no interloper. This is his home. If he were to forget it, all his ancestral tablets in Mukden, former capital of Manchuria, would be a constant reminder. And, finally, there must always remain with the new Regent the memory of the "unsavoury" insult to which he was subjected by the Chinese Government. No further obligation rests upon him to respect the Abdication Treaty. It was torn up on his doorstep.

There must be a question in the Regent's mind whether by that very act the Chinese had not sacrificed all moral

right to Manchuria. The same question may have been in the thoughts of the outraged Chinese. For in 1924 Tang Shao-yi said:

"The Manchus have property in China. Some of the property is their own; that is, they had it before they became Emperors. Some is family property. If a change is to be made, there must be an arrangement on this question. We cannot steal a man's property simply because he was formerly an Emperor. The moral sense of the Chinese people rejects that sort of treatment." (*Peking Daily News*, November 15, 1924.)

Was Mr. Tang referring to Manchuria? In Manchu eyes Manchuria meets all the requirements of family property before and after the Manchus became Emperors. It was their private estate up till 1907. It was their Vice-royalty from 1907 until 1911. It was then resigned by treaty in return for certain rights which the Chinese stole in 1924. Query: What is the status of Manchuria, ethically speaking? The question is raised as a moral issue merely as the other side of the shield which protests so indignantly the sanctity of Chinese sovereign rights in Manchuria. It may be put side by side with the historical warrant for the separatism existing between Manchuria and China.

### Political Independence

Let us now reach down to the political realities of Manchurian separatism. Hitherto China's title to Manchuria in the eyes of the world has rested upon what is known as "international reference." That is to say Chinese sovereignty has been recognized by virtue of treaties reached with China over Manchurian questions. But there has always been a doubt—preliminary to treaty making. The doubt has taken the form of the question: "What is China?" As late as the Washington Conference of 1921-22, it was asked, if only "incidentally," as

W. W. Willoughby remarks, in his "China at the Conference." For the Chinese delegation, however, Dr. Wellington Koo treated the query seriously, and outlined the area given in the Republican Constitution as fortified by the Abdication Treaty—namely, the area outside the Wall, including Mongolia as well as Manchuria. The Conference accepted Dr. Koo's re-definition, and proceeded to insure the territorial and administrative integrity of the Constitution limits through the famous Nine Power Pact.

Let us first look at territorial integrity. This means that China should be kept one and indivisible against foreign encroachment.

Even while the Washington Conference was sitting, Soviet Russia was preparing to Sovietize Outer Mongolia. This area is Manchuria's next door neighbor. It is more than that. Frontiers between the two countries are so illegible that none can say where one begins or the other ends. The line of demarcation is the power of conquest. Anything that happens in Outer Mongolia is therefore just as much a Manchurian problem as if it happened in Manchuria. But, while Manchuria is on the beaten track, Outer Mongolia is not. Nobody has seen the way the Soviet have carried their influence right to the Manchurian "border" except the Japanese. Says a recent writer, "over this huge domain, which abuts for more than a thousand miles on Asiatic Russia, Moscow now exercises what to all intents and purposes is an overlordship, keeping it practically closed to the outside world." (I. I. Serebrennikov, in *Foreign Affairs*, April 1931). According to Professor A. N. Holcombe, in his "The Chinese Revolution," visas allowing foreigners to travel through Mongolia have to be obtained in Moscow. Yet the fiction is maintained in Nanking of keeping a Com-

mittee on Mongolian affairs when not one member could get into Mongolia save with Soviet permission! For any fiction that the powers can maintain, the Chinese can always think of a better one, and carry it through with a straighter face.

While Soviet Russia was Sovietizing Outer Mongolia, she signed a solemn agreement with China recognizing that "Outer Mongolia is an integral part of the Republic of China." She furthermore pledged herself to respect "China's sovereignty therein." In books on Soviet policy the word "Sovereignty" is usually given "suzerainty" (see "The Soviet in World Affairs," by Louis Fischer), but no amount of legerdemain can erase the proper word, which appears in black and white in the official text. The agreement saved China's "face." Russia continued to supervise Outer Mongolia as if nothing had happened. China continued to support its Committee on Mongolian Affairs as if it were a real Committee. And the world, in spite of the Nine Power Pact, continued to ignore Outer Mongolia.

Now as to "administrative integrity." This means that the powers should deal with one authority as representative of all China.

As applied to Manchuria there has never been any extension of authority from the recognized administrative center of China. Manchuria has always been separate. Only when the late Chang Tso-lin ran the government at Peking (Peiping) was there any kind of integrity between China and Manchuria. But it was the same Manchurian integrity that the Manchu Emperors imposed on China.

The Washington Conference met while Marshal Chang was the overlord of Manchuria. He also happened to be the ruling partner with another warlord of the Peking



government. Power in North China oscillated back and forth over the Great Wall just as it did prior to the Manchu conquest. Turmoil continued throughout the year in which the Washington Conference conventions were signed, 1922. And the upshot was that in the usual spring war Chang Tso-lin was ousted from Peking. Thereupon he severed his connections with China Proper, calmly pocketed railway and salt revenues belonging to the Peking government, and settled down in his capital at Mukden, intent on training his soldiery with the view of exacting revenge. His chance came in 1924, when Peking again returned under his sway. Again China became Chang Tso-lin, or Manchuria. Feuds seesawed north and south until the Nationalists succeeded in ejecting Chang from Peking in 1928. About to cut adrift again, the Manchurian overlord was killed on his retreat to Mukden.

Precisely the same policy of independence was pursued by his successor and son, Chang Hsiao-liang. On his own ground young Chang was subject to no superior. Manchuria was in fact as independent as it was under his father. But it wasn't the honest kind of independence which his ex-brigand father followed. Young Chang became a member of the Nationalist party, his membership, however, being another of those fictions with which the Chinese bedazzle the world and themselves. In theory it carried with it the duty of respect for the authority of the party dictatorship which supposedly runs the country from Nanking. Chang ignored the duty. He kept his own personal army of 350,000 men. He owned his own arsenal. He pocketed Chinese government revenues within his borders. He issued and then debased his own currency to buy the farmers' produce which he sold in the world market for gold or silver.

What other attributes of political independence can



one think of than these? If a governor of New York built up an army of 350,000 men, issued his own currency, erected his own arsenal, and engaged in continuous wars with his neighbors, would the people of America think that his Nationalist party membership was an offset sufficient to consider New York as still belonging to the Union?

Any state which had to deal with the Manchurian government had to recognize this fact. Soviet Russia was one. Moscow never boggled over the niceties signed, sealed and delivered at the Washington Conference. In 1924, when she entered into relations with China, she actually negotiated treaties with the two Chinas of the day, the one at Peking (Peiping) and the one at Mukden, with Chang Tso-lin. It is this latter agreement that is the ruling instrument today.

Soviet Russia continued to treat with Manchuria long after relations between China and Russia were broken off in 1928. In 1929 Moscow responded to a challenge from the Manchurian officials, who had dismissed the Russian officials of the Chinese Eastern Railway, the 1,000-mile North Manchurian line operated jointly by Russia and China, by invading North Manchuria, and bringing local officialdom to book. In other words, she restored the *status quo ante* by force. An agreement at Habarovsk was signed with the Manchurian authority, and, in spite of the lack of any resumption of relations between Nanking and Moscow, a Chinese mission is still in Moscow negotiating its implementation.

Then there is the psychological aspect of Manchurian separatism. The lack of affinity between the two sides of the Great Wall has recently been attested by Owen Lattimore in his book: "Manchuria: Cradle of Conflict." After a long study of sociological and anthropological

conditions in Manchuria, he comes to this conclusion about the attitude of the Chinese settler:

"He is no longer defended by the Great Wall frontier; it is China that is defended by the Wall from him and his compeers. In other words, there is a partial and curious, but most significant substitution of regional feeling for race or national feeling."

Mr. Lattimore shows how different is this attitude from that of other Chinese who have settled in such far countries as the Straits Settlements and the Americas. These remain nationalistic—or, shall we say, they become nationalistic, for the farther the Chinese go from China the more patriotism they develop.

During the Sino-Japanese trouble in Manchuria overseas Chinese waxed enthusiastically patriotic. Chinese on the spot, however, regarded nationalistic claims with the utmost indifference. Their only concern was to see the installation of a new regime based on enough peace and order to allow them to work unmolested. In other words, they had a Manchurian outlook. After interviewing the refugees who flocked into China Proper in October the Peiping correspondent of the *New York Times* sent a report of their opinions which appeared in the issue of November 15, 1931. The following are a few paragraphs from it:

"The thousands of Chinese refugees who have fled from Manchuria into China Proper bring tales of ruthless exploitation by the Manchurian soldiery, regular and irregular, who have been serving the late Chang Tso-lin and his son, Chang Hsiao-liang, for the benefit of the warlords.

"Stories of high-handed methods in expropriating the land for the Chang clique are far more current than complaints of Japanese rule.

"The refugees say that they are not at all anxious to have the *status quo ante* restored in Manchuria, as the League of Nations has suggested. They claim that if the League really has the welfare of the Chinese people at heart, it would devise something better for them than such an arrangement.

"For years they have lived in semi-terror. They have seen the Manchurian currency fall from par to a thousandth part of

its original value. They have been forced to sell crops for worthless paper to the Chinese government, (meaning the Mukden government) which in turn sold the crops to the Japanese and others for gold yen. They have paid out most of their earnings in taxes to keep up the Manchurian military machine, which has made three expeditions into China, largely at their expense. They accuse the two Changs of having farmed out huge tracts of forest and agricultural lands to their favorites, who have exploited the people in every possible way.

"These refugees hope that a reorganized Chinese government may be established in Manchuria, either under Japanese influence or with Japanese support. They do not want the old oppressors back again."

No more evidence is needed to show why the Chinese in Manchuria couldn't share the sympathy with Warlord Chang Hsiao-liang that animated the breasts of the Chinese in, say, Peru. The settlers' apartness began psychologically. It developed politically. As soon as they passed through the Great Wall and took their part in the development of Manchuria separatism from China was reinforced by the misrule and oppression to which they were subject by the "two Changs."

In view of all these facts we come to the conclusion that practically the only difference between the new Pu Yi government and its predecessor, the Chang Hsiao-liang government, is that the former has asked for formal recognition of independence.

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1. Since this was written the Nanking government has decided to abandon "face" and fiction and acknowledge separatism even in China Proper. This was announced by "a high government spokesman" to the *New York Times* and appeared in that newspaper dated May 8, 1932. It was provoked by the outbreak of rebellion at Canton. Thus the policy of the administrative integrity of China has been returned to the laps of the powers. What will they do with it? Fight Canton and the Communists and the independent satraps in order to restore it? Keep up the fiction of saying that China is integral and pursuing

regional diplomacy as hitherto? Or follow the example of the Nanking government and say that the fiction is after all not a fact?

### Japan's Rights

Japan's interests in Manchuria are based on the fruits of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 when Japan saved Manchuria for China. At that time Japan did not know that China was a secret treaty partner with Russia in the aim of pushing Japan off the Asiatic mainland and leaving Russia in control of both Korea and Manchuria. This was officially revealed for the first time at the Washington Conference. If she had known it, as Mr. Yosuke Matsuoka told the Institute of Pacific Relations at Kyoto in 1929, there would have been no Manchurian problem today; Japan would have attached Manchuria. But, not knowing of China's secret participation, Japan merely claimed as the price of winning the War the reversion of Russia's interests in South Manchuria, to which certain additions were subsequently made by treaty with China. Under the Portsmouth treaty, ending the Russo-Japanese War, Russia was allowed to retain her North Manchurian privileges radiating from the Chinese Eastern Railway.

In skeleton Japanese Manchuria consists of the principal railway, the South Manchuria Railway, 700 miles long, and a port, Dairen, which is by far the main outlet of Manchuria. Both were part of the Russian lease prior to 1904. In the zone there are valuable coal and iron ore mines which are also concessioned to Japan. In all the Japanese investment in these concessioned properties amounts to over a billion dollars.

As protection Japan is allowed, as Russia was allowed, to station in the railway zone military guards numbering less than 15,000. Much has been made in Chinese prop-



aganda of this privilege. It is often stated that by the Treaty of Peking of 1905, by which China recognized the reversion to Japan of the Russian rights, Japan promised to withdraw her guards when the Russians did. After the Russian Revolution the guards on the Chinese Eastern Railway were forced out of Manchuria. Should the Japanese have done the same? There is nothing in the treaty to that effect. According to the treaty, simultaneous withdrawal was to be accomplished only when "tranquility has been reestablished and China shall herself become capable of affording full protection for the lives and property of foreigners." (Certainly there has never been any evidence of tranquility in Manchuria.) Manchurian Chinese told the *New York Times* that they had lived in "semi-terror" under the two Changs. Manchuria, it is true, has been dammed from the invasion of civil warfare from China Proper, but the dam has been erected by the Japanese guards; the fixed policy of the Tokyo Government being to keep Manchuria shielded from the terrible wastefulness of Chinese strife.

The main bone of contention between Japan and China has been the extension of the time-limit of the Japanese concessions in Manchuria by the treaties of 1915.

These treaties are known in history as the Twenty-One Demands. Give a dog a bad name and it will stick to him. Appearances govern opinions more easily than realities. When you hear people mention the Twenty-One Demands, ask them to name a few, and you will find that they will name the "Demands" or "Wishes" that were either dropped soon after they were put on paper or abandoned in the intervening years. But the obnoxious odor still remains as if they governed the relations between China and Japan.

Only about seven of the twenty-one, as a matter of



fact, remain as of any practical importance. These refer almost wholly to Japan's rights in South Manchuria. Far from taking exception to the wishes that finally entered into treaty form in 1915, the powers took the first opportunity to reassert the most-favored-nation clause in their own treaties with China.

But the major fact in connection with the 1915 treaties is that the Chinese themselves have recognized them by seventeen years of usage.

China claims that these privileges were extorted under duress. The question of what is meant by duress may be left to the hair-splitting attention of international lawyers. They have been arguing this question for years. However, the Chinese base their charge, not on the facts of the case, but on the assertion that the treaties have never been ratified by a Chinese legislative body. The Provisional Constitution, the only sure constitution in Nationalist eyes, lays down the rule: "The Provisional President shall have power with the concurrence of the National Council to declare war and conclude treaties (Article 35)." It would be interesting, however, for the Chinese to add how many treaties have been ratified by a Chinese legislative body. It would also be more to the point to say how long a legislative body has ever sat in the distracted political life of China.

The constitutional Parliament had such a brief life in Republican China that many of the Nationalists of the present day will scarcely remember it. Meeting in Peking on April 8, 1913, it was dominated by the Nationalist party, many of whom, three months later, took the field against President Yuan Shih-kai in the so-called Second Revolution. When the revolt had been put down, the Parliamentarians returned to work, with the acquiescence of Yuan, who wished them to go through the formality

of electing him permanent President. This accomplished, on November 4, 1913, he ordered the dissolution of the Nationalist party, on the ground that it was a seditious organization. Such an act, in view of the overwhelming preponderance of Nationalists in the Parliament, was equivalent to a dissolution.

Yuan then ruled without a Parliament. He was in this position when the Sino-Japanese treaties were signed in 1915. On June 6, 1916 he died. Meantime the Nationalists were meeting sometimes in Canton, sometimes in Shanghai. To Peking they were rebels. To themselves they were the true constitutional parliament. Wars continued to enliven proceedings in both Canton and Peking, China being so big that she can support more than one civil war at a time. Then on August 1, 1916, the new President reconvened the old Parliament under the Provisional Constitution; again they were dissolved, on June 13, 1917. The Constitutionals then lapsed into a rebel movement until they succeeded in establishing themselves in power as the Nationalist government in 1928, eleven years after the dissolution.

This brief review would show that the constitutional Parliament sat only 17 months at most in a Republican life of 17 years up to 1928.

In 1915 President Yuan signed the Sino-Japanese agreements because, in the words of C. Walter Young, in "The International Legal Status of the Kwantung Leased Territory" (p. 170), he was "the only Chinese commanding authority in and for China from the point of view of competence to deal with foreign states." Sufficient for Japan in these circumstances that ratifications were exchanged through the Ministers at Peking and Tokyo. Mr. Young adds: "The treaties of 1915 were not isolated cases, for several treaties with foreign states

were negotiated during this period and after, which were never ratified by any Chinese Parliament." Let us stick to "during this period," say, between 1913 and 1917. Immediately before the Sino-Japanese treaty there was the precedent of the treaty with Russia of November 5, 1913 over Mongolia. Immediately after the Sino-Japanese treaty another treaty with Russia on the same subject was signed on June 7, 1915. Neither received Parliamentary approval. The crowning example of the suspension of Article 35 of the Provisional Constitution was the declaration of war on Germany on August 14, 1917, two weeks after the final dissolution of Parliament.

### Nullifying the Treaties

Warlord Chang Hsiao-liang started to undermine the treaty position of Japan in Manchuria soon after he assumed office. First he tried to push out Soviet Russia. If the Russians had not visited prompt reprisal upon Manchuria, the move would have been successful. As with the Abdication Treaty, the Chinese tried to tear up the agreement allowing of joint control with Soviet Russia of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Balked in North Manchuria, Chang turned to South Manchuria, thinking that Japan, with her more responsible place in the world, would be afraid to copy the Soviet example. He tried to push out Japan.

Lines parallel to the South Manchuria Railway were built. This was a violation of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of December 22, 1905. Chang refused to implement treaties for railway building which had been secured prior to his regime. Discrimination was exercised on Chinese government lines in contravention of the Nine Power Pact signed at the Washington Conference. Chang placed

obstacles in the way of the operation of Japanese mining properties in South Manchuria which were not envisaged in the relevant treaties. He levied illegal taxes on Japanese-mined coal. It was impossible to purchase land as provided for by the 1915 treaty. Residence outside the railway zone was practically impossible to Japanese as the result of harassment by local officials. Koreans, who are Japanese subjects, were unable to exercise their treaty right to lease agricultural land.

Procrastination took the shape of referring Japanese complaints to Nanking. This was the purpose for which Chang joined the Nationalist party. His strategy was remarkably successful. Nanking not only knew nothing about the incidents but could not make its writ run in Manchuria even if it did. Chinese in Manchuria were emboldened to maltreat Japanese lives as well as their property. The most notorious case, one that filled Japan with indignation, was the killing of Captain Shintaro Nakamura, of the General Staff, with his travelling companions. This occurred on June 28 last year. Just prior to this outrage, a farmers' quarrel over the lease of land to Korean settlers at Wanposhan drew blood. Chang Hsiao-liang remained just as inert as if the complaints had had reference to Japanese property. In all, about 300 grievances had piled up by September 18, 1931 (for details see "Instances of China's Violation of Treaties and Agreements" compiled by the Research Office, South Manchuria Railway Company, October 20, 1931).

Though as elusive as air, China is as solid as a phantom steam roller when it comes to aggression. Soviet Russia found this out in 1929. Japan was due for a similar coup on September 18. In the night of that date Chinese soldiery started to tear up the track of the South



Manchuria Railway at a place near Mukden. Thanks to the tension that the Chinese had themselves created, the Japanese guards were ready to meet the challenge, and the manner in which they met it made the Manchurian problem a world problem.

The incident itself, however, is about the least important part of the whole affair. Explanations have differed. The Chinese say one thing; the Japanese another. Unfortunately it is always impossible to arrange for neutrals to be present on these dramatic occasions. In view of this difficulty, Japan has the right to ask neutrals to adopt the attitude of Lord Grey of Fallodon. Nobody will need to be reminded of this British statesman's high-mindedness and his devotion to peace. If he had any bias, it would have been the bias of the League of Nations, as he is the head of the League of Nations Union in Great Britain. But, in spite of this office, he said (*London Times*, November 13, 1931):

"If I wanted to pass judgment on what has been going on in Manchuria, I would want to know first of all how much real provocation the Japanese had, not from the Chinese government, but from the lawless state of things which has been existing from want of government."

If the neutral follows Lord Grey's example he will have appreciated by this time the amount of "real provocation" that Japan has suffered. Turn back to the Manchurian refugees' story to the *New York Times* for an account of conditions that these persecuted people had to endure. Then on top of these conditions regard this statement of what Japan had to endure; written in the form of a letter written to the *Peking and Tientsin Times* dated October 24, 1931, by the Tientsin British Committee of Information, a body composed of the leading British business men at Tientsin:

"The fact is that the Chinese, by a policy of utter irresponsibility and all-round aggravation, brought this on themselves.



They literally goaded the Japanese into action. Braggadocio and arrogance on the one hand were united with prolonged dodging of responsibility on the other."

Now the world has come to understand more about the "real provocation" suffered by Japan. The truth of Japanese charges has also been grasped by the chairman of the League of Nations Commission to Manchuria, Lord Lytton. At Shanghai he said (*New York Times*, April 10, 1932):

"It is not possible for any nation to cultivate hatred and hostility toward other countries and then expect the League of Nations to step in and save it from the consequences of that attitude."

The world now is concerned with the method adopted by Japan to deal with the Manchurian situation. We have explained under several heads that Manchuria is in a class by itself. Japan has never been able to handle Manchurian questions by waiting on Nanking. Such a method has always been barren of result because Nanking does not represent Manchuria. It follows that to meet Nanking through her representatives at Geneva was equally idle. The Geneva representative did not represent Manchuria. Soviet Russia dealt with Manchuria on the spot. Japan did the same. She took means dictated by self-defense and therefore allowed by the Kellogg Pact of preserving her property in the face of an immediate situation similar in type to the Russian situation in 1929. To have wired to Geneva would have been to invite the destruction of a valuable Japanese railway property. Nobody would think of asking a man who was pointing a pistol at his middle to wait until the police had been called.

After the necessary protective measures had been taken, however, Japan tried to negotiate a peaceful settlement with Chang Hsiao-liang at Peiping. The news-

papers for the first week in December of last year give an account of these conversations. But the effect was vain. The reason will bear a detailed explanation.

### The League as Third Party

Sir Austen Chamberlain, in the British House of Commons on March 6 this year, spoke of the League of Nations' victory in the Manchurian affair in "getting between the two parties." The League *has* gotten between the two parties. It has prevented them, not from making war, as Sir Austen had in mind, but from making peace.

This was a victory—but for the Chinese. Setting one tribe against another, as we have seen, has always been the way that China has worked out her foreign policy. Since 1929 she has aimed at bringing about precisely the present result of making the League of Nations a buffer in the quarrels she has precipitated so irresponsibly.

At the 1929 League Assembly China tried to invoke Article 19 of the Covenant which calls for the review of treaties which have allegedly become inapplicable by the lapse of time. It is China's contention that all the treaties which limit China's sovereignty in the slightest are inapplicable within the meaning of this article. The motion was shelved. If it had been taken up, Germany was waiting on the sidelines with the Versailles Treaty in her hands, bent on making a similar request. China returned to her "revolutionary diplomacy" and Manchuria to her "nullification movement."

China imagined that an appeal to the League about the September 18 incident would succeed at last in bringing the treaties under review. In other words, she brought Article 19 back to Geneva. The League Council

failed utterly to see the strategy. It betrayed abysmal ignorance, even of the A B C's of the Japanese-Chinese strain in Manchuria. This was evident as soon as Japan produced her five-point formula for a Sino-Japanese settlement. For the fifth point, which asked for a detailed adherence to the treaty points under dispute, M. Briand suggested the substitution of a simple clause to the effect that China should respect all her treaty commitments. He imagined that that was a smooth way of pouring oil on the troubled waters.

The Japanese government's statement on the Manchurian situation issued on October 20, 1931, contains these five points:

- (1) Mutual repudiation of aggressive policy and conduct.
- (2) Respect for China's territorial integrity.
- (3) Complete suppression of all organized movements interfering with freedom of trade and stirring up international hatred.
- (4) Effective protection throughout Manchuria of all peaceful pursuits undertaken by Japanese subjects.
- (5) Respect for treaty rights of Japan in Manchuria.

M. Briand must have been astonished when the Chinese delegate turned him down flat. For the first time he began to realize what it was all about. What treaties? That was the crux. As Hugh Byas (*New York Times*, October 31, 1932) stated in a message referring to M. Briand's suggestion:

"Nothing could more clearly reveal how little the complications of the Manchurian question were understood at Geneva."

In erecting the League into a kind of buffer for its irresponsibility, China has been especially zealous in cultivating the Secretariat's goodwill. For three years members of the Secretariat have gone back and forth between China and Geneva. The aim was to take over the economic restoration of China. What is there to show for all this expense, activity and effort? The visits have not even resulted in the publication of original data for which in other spheres the League economic section has achieved such a merited reputation. The Secretariat became embogged in Chinese politics. China made them more Chinese than the Chinese.

M. Rajchman, Health member of the Secretariat, while serving as liaison officer at Nanking for the League Secretariat, held a position very close to the Chinese government, through his association with President Chiang Kai-shek himself. He it was upon whose advice, it is said, an appeal to the League was dispatched to take action when Japan had done nothing more than protect the South Manchuria Railway from being wrecked by Chinese rabble-soldiery.

From then on Japan became the prisoner at the bar, with "High League circles" (presumably the Secretariat) setting up a backfire of newspaper reports, forecasting sanctions all the way up from the withdrawal of ambassadors from Tokyo to an economic boycott. That is to say, public opinion throughout the world was being poisoned against Japan while she was trying at Geneva to explain her case and at Peiping to effect a peaceful settlement.

Japan's view of the responsibility of the Secretariat for this state of things is supported by well-informed neutral opinion. "Augur," the pseudonym of a well-known European writer for the *New York Times*, says in

the issue of October 26, 1931, that one of the troubled features of the whole Manchurian situation was:

"The policy pursued by the Secretariat of the League, which for quite a long time has been making a pet of the government in Nanking. Whatever the truth, the Chinese have managed to convey to the world the impression that they have been, and will go on acting on, the advice of the League Secretariat."

A grave charge of *ex parte* conduct when world peace was at stake!

What were the results of League interference? The wrecking of the peaceful settlement under way with Chang Hsiao-liang at Peiping was one. Chinese never wish to perpetuate a discord when their bluff has been called. But when they were ready to "call it a day," they found that they had so successfully absorbed the League in their cause that they were hamstrung. Another result was the fear expressed by the Chinese refugees to the *New York Times* that the League was bent on restoring the Chang misrule. Yet another result was the wisdom after the event of Lord Lytton at Shanghai.

### **What Japan is Doing**

Nothing in Japan's action, it should now be evident, comes within the meaning of the so-called Stimson or Hoover doctrine as stated on January 7, 1932, and elaborated in Secretary Stimson's letter to Senator Borah on February 24, 1932. Therein the United States government laid down the policy that no "situation, treaty or agreement" would be recognized which was brought about by means contrary to the Kellogg Pact. Self-defense, which inspired Japan's resistance to Chinese aggression of September 18, 1931, against the South Manchuria Railway, is reserved by all signatories to the Kellogg Pact.



Japan then tried to carry out her obligations under the Pact by seeking a peaceful settlement in the Peiping negotiations last December, but the League of Nations, by "getting between the two parties," made the conversations abortive.

In default Japan is now trying to collect her own security. There was no alternative. On September 18, Manchuria was deserted by all regular Chinese authority, which retained the bulk of its soldiery inside the Great Wall, leaving the new Pu Yi government at Changchun to cope with conditions which had long been hopelessly anarchic outside the railway zones. Japan has always kept a Japanese peace against external aggression from China Proper since the Russo-Japanese War. In behalf of the new government at Changchun she is now trying to extend it to the countryside so as to expedite the return of order and trade and to foster economic development which will redound to everybody's advantage.

There are commentators who seem to find the presence of bandits in Manchuria somewhat amusing. The innuendo is that the Japanese have invented them. Let them turn again to the Manchurian refugees' story. Probably these same commentators would be astonished to know that in China Proper a sixth of the area is now under the control of a Chinese Soviet Republic. This is not known for the same reason that the Manchurian bandits prior to September 18 were not known—it hasn't yet created any external trouble.

For years the Manchurian "redbeards," or bandits, have ruled this vast hinterland of Manchuria. To quote J. L. Garvin, editor of the *London "Observer"* of November 15, 1931:

"Manchuria swarms with bandits. When Chinese military formations are broken up, disbanding soldiers remain gunmen

and become brigands. Did the Japanese withdraw at once from the outlying areas, their subjects and properties would be doubly threatened by attack and depredation. No Japanese government can 'name a date' until new provisions for order are established in the territories through which their affairs ramify outside their strictly treaty zone."

The task that Japan has shouldered in this respect is no light one. Guerillas always provide a difficult proposition for regular troops. Americans learned this lesson after the Spanish-American War when they essayed the task of pacifying the Philippines. It took 60,000 troops two years to put down 10,000 Filipino guerillas. A similar experience befell the British in South Africa after the Boer War. Apply the same lesson to Manchuria and you get some idea of the dimensions of the Japanese task.

Japan is not concerned with the complexion of the new administration beyond seeing that it does not play ducks and drakes with the Japanese interest. As Premier Inukai has stated: "Japan wouldn't take Manchuria as a gift." All she wants is the fulfillment of treaties and engagements to which China pledged her word long before September 18 but which she has sidestepped by an unequalled course of "real provocation."

Whatever the domestic future of Manchuria, Japan is bent upon upholding her treaty position. This is the true *status quo ante*, and there is nothing in this resolve which makes, or is likely to lead to, "a situation, treaty, or agreement" which would violate the Stimson doctrine. Rather it would bring back prosperity to Manchuria and contribute in no small degree to the restoration of peaceful trading conditions of which the commerce of the world is so badly in need. That this will be the outcome is apparently the opinion of the Radio Corporation of America, which is the first concern to enter into a contract with the new government. One need not linger to point

the irony of this contract in view of the business-like attitude which it demonstrates.

There remains the question of Japan's relations with Soviet Russia. Hitherto the special interests of both countries in Manchuria have made this territory a kind of three-party condominium with China. But the weakness of China has allowed Soviet Russia to penetrate Chinese sovereignty outside the Wall in a manner that has been almost as alarming to Japan as the Chinese provocation. Chinese Turkestan has been detached from Chinese control. A Soviet railroad now skirts the western rim of Outer Mongolia. Most importantly Outer Mongolia has fallen into Moscow's lap. Therefore, Japan has considered that, in reply to Soviet Russia's objections to Japanese penetration into North Manchuria, she has given a sufficient answer when she says: "What about Outer Mongolia?" That one is a counterweight to the other from the standpoint of Soviet-Japanese relations.

